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E C O N O M IC  NOTES:
The rise of 
'The New Conservatism’
W ith friends like these . . . from left, Thatcher, Reagan and hraser. 
Drawing by Colquhoun from April .'S F inancia l Review.
Most readers will have heard of 
som ething called “F riedm ania”, or the 
apparently m anic concern of some in the 
ruling class to adopt the politico-economic 
position put by Milton Friedman. Most will 
also have heard it alleged th a t we are
witnessing, in A ustralia and in other 
English-speaking countries a t least, an 
emergence of the “new righ t” or a libertarian 
social and political philosophy. The concern 
of these Notes is not so much with the 
content of the Friedm an/von Hayek1 
p o s itio n  of la is se z - fa ire  or of th e
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libertarianism  more generally but to 
examine briefly the curious esteem in which 
they seem to be held within the ruling class 
in several countries. For it is curious th a t 
they are so esteemed: they contain no 
justification of the large concentrations of 
economic power th a t characterise monopoly 
capitalism; indeed they are antagonistic to 
such concentrations of power. How, then, to 
account for the appeal of Friedm an and his 
ilk?
F rie d m a n ’s P o s itio n
Broadly, Friedm an’s position is th a t the 
state (or government) is too much involved 
in too m any aspects of most communities. 
The state severely constrains each person’s 
freedom to choose. According to Friedman,
• each person should have perfect freedom to 
choose (in regard to occupation, spending or 
saving, setting up an enterprise, etc.) 
according to his or her own interests (and not 
exclusively m aterialist interests). This sort 
of freedom to choose (or “economic freedom", 
in F riedm an’s words) "...is an  essential 
requisite for political freedom. By enabling 
people to co-operate with one another 
without coercion or central direction, it 
reduces the area over which political power 
is exercised. In addition, by dispersing 
power, the free m arket provides an  offset to 
whatever concentration of political power 
may arise”.- In the view of the Friedmans, 
the abolition of most of the state 's 
intervention in modern capitalist economies 
would restore the people’s freedom to choose, 
and the freedom of the market.
Friedm an’s position is “supported” by 
reasoning th a t is flawed, by assertions th a t 
frequently lack any justification and by 
“examples” from a brazenly re-written 
history of the past two hundred years. One of 
the most basic flaws in Friedm an’s 
reasoning is th a t it is government (or 
institutions, such as unions, endorsed if not 
supported by governments) which is most 
im portant in restricting a person’s freedom 
to choose self-interestedly. This flaw is not 
p a r t ic u la r ly  e v id e n t in  F r ie d m a n ’s 
discussion of a worker’s freedom to sell his or 
her labour power. Nowhere in Free to Choose 
:i is there any concession to the restrictions 
imposed on a person’s choice by the 
experiences and expectations of parents and 
grandparents or by the person’s present 
cultural milieu. Nowhere is there any 
concession to the fact th a t vast numbers of
workers are paid so poorly in comparison 
with the extent of day-to-day expenditures 
demanded or people living within a 
capitalist economy th a t it is impossible to 
choose not to work full time let alone to be 
able to save. Nowhere is it conceded th a t 
there are restrictions on the establishm ent of 
enterprises which have nothing to do with 
regulation by the state. Nowhere, in other 
words, is there more than  a whiff of a society 
divided into social classes or, in particular, 
an acknowledgement th a t most workers are 
not free to choose not to be workers. And 
even if there were genuine freedom of 
contract in labour markets, th a t could not be 
accounted as being of great importance in 
comparison with the worker’s increasing 
inability to control his or her labour within 
the process of production.
In Free to Choose, the Friedm ans cite 
“examples” of the prosperity th a t has ruled 
where government has been small. Taking 
the size of state expenditure as a m easure of 
the role of the state, the Friedm ans note th a t 
small government during the nineteenth 
century in the United States was associated 
with rapid growth in per capita income. The 
millions of im m igrants prospered “because 
they were left to their own resources...The 
streets of New York were not paved with 
gold, but hard work, th rift and enterprise 
brought rewards th a t were not even 
im aginable in the Old World”.4 There was a 
“flowering of charitable activity” a t the 
sam e time, of course, but apparently such 
activity was a pleasant way of passing the 
time, rather than  som ething th a t was 
necessary to offset the ravages of largely 
unconstrained capitalism . In Hong Kong at 
the present time, government is small; in 
fac t, Hong Kong, acco rd in g  to the 
Friedm ans, is “the modern example of free 
m a rk e ts  a n d  lim ited  g o v e rn m e n t” . ’ 
Residents are free, one learns, to buy from 
whom they choose and to invest however 
they choose; and those who own the 
apartm ent buildings are free to cram in 
sufficient people a t sufficiently high rents to 
be able to amortise their investm ents in one 
year. (Not th a t this last is cited by the 
Friedmans).
Perhaps the most im portant of the 
statem ents which Milton Friedm an is wont 
to make without support concerns the 
concentration of ownership and control of 
the m eans of production. In Free to Choose, 
the Friedm ans dispose of the problem (!) of a
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concentration of ownership and control in a 
mere three paragraphs. The problem, in 
their view, is simply th a t of the control of 
prices. “But”, one learns, “let the automobile 
producers of the world compete with General 
Motors, Ford and Chrysler for the custom of 
the American buyer and the spectre of 
monopoly pricing disappears”.6 Apparently 
the tariff - and no one particular form of 
government support of private capital - is the 
only reason for monopolies. It is really 
rem arkable th a t the Friedm ans can quite so 
cavalierly ignore all th a t even their 
colleagues in the m ainstream  of economics 
have said about the inherent tendencies 
to w ard s co n cen tra tio n  in  c a s p ita lis t  
economies. The Friedm ans failure to be 
particularly concerned about monopolis­
ation makes theirs a distinctly incomplete 
libertarianism .
L ib e r ta r ia n is m  P ro p e r
Properly, libertarianism  m ust repudiate 
the concentration of economic power in 
private hands. And in Australia at the 
Cross-roads, a libertarian trac t written by 
several notable A ustralians and published 
recently, one finds such a repudiation. One 
of the nine elements of the au thors’ 
libertarian scenario is “resolute application 
of anti-monopoly and restrictive trade 
p rac tices  le g is la tio n ” .7 So, p roperly , 
libertarianism  cannot provide a justification 
of modern monopoly capitalism  in which the 
tendency of capital itseif is to concentrate 
and centralise the control of raw materials, 
m arkets and technologies.
It seems to me tha t the seeming zeal with 
which large corporations and the daily press 
have adopted Milton Friedm an and his 
position is to be explained on the one hand, 
by the concern of corporations themselves to 
prune the size of government and, on the 
other hand, by the happy choice of the 
Friedm ans to remain virtually silent on the 
question of concentration of economic power 
in private hands. However, it rem ains to 
examine why it is th a t large corporations 
should w ant to see the size of government 
pruned and whether they w ant to see the 
activities of the state reduced across the 
board.
C a p i t a l  a n d  S m a l le r  G o v e rn m e n t
It has been forcefully argued by M arx and 
by modern m arxists th a t m any of the
activities of the state are to be understood as 
its attem pts to m anage the interests of 
capital as a whole. As even a non-marxist - 
an em inent American - put it recently 
“...capitalism needs some power (that is, the 
state) th a t can stabilise the conditions 
needed for innovation and competition.”8 
Left to themselves, large corporations are 
capable of competing with each other so 
savagely as to dam age the whole fabric of a 
capitalist economy. Even one very large 
corporation is capable of undermining the 
financial system of a relatively small 
e c o n o m y  a n d  o f  d i s t u r b i n g  th e  
in te rd e p e n d e n c ie s  b e tw een  d if fe re n t 
branches of industry. A large corporation 
which has achieved a monopoly of some 
im p o rta n t raw  m a te r ia l can , if  left 
unrestrained, critically increase costs of 
production in m any areas of an  economy. 
For individual corporations it is rational to 
keep wages as low as possible; yet wages 
must increase as productivity increases if 
the commodities th a t are produced are to be 
sold. There is, in fact, a host of conditions 
which the state attem pts to assure, 
conditions for the accumulation of capital in 
general in the face of conflicts between 
sectors of the economy, between industries 
and between corporations. And beyond 
attem pting to assure the accumulation of 
capital in general, the state has an 
im portant role in helping to legitimate a 
system of production which yields social 
imbalances such as failing to provide full 
employment while rewarding a few people 
very handsom ely indeed. If  the state is so 
im portant, though, in modern capitalist 
economies, why the evident concern of 
capital with its size?
R eac tin g  to  “ T h e  F isca l C r is is ”
It seems to me th a t this concern can be 
explained by two factors. Those factors are 
(i) w hat has come to be known as “the fiscal 
crisis of the sta te”, and (ii) a sense th a t the 
necessary functions of the state can be 
p e r fo rm e d  w ith  a s m a l le r  p u b lic  
bureaucracy and hence with less revenue 
than  is currently involved.
A fiscal crisis is said to develop in so far as 
the expenditure in which the state is 
expected to engage tends to outstrip the 
revenue which it can raise. Expenditures 
include those which are necessary for social
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control, by m eans of the th reat or actuality of 
police coercion or by m eans of legitimisation 
through the provision of welfare services, for 
example, and expenditures which are more 
directly necessary for capital accumulation 
such as those involved in the train ing of the 
w ork fo rce  a n d  th e  c o n s tru c tio n  of 
infrastructure. Revenue may come from 
borrowings, from the profits of state-owned 
enterprises or from taxation.
Especially in circumstances of high 
inflation and slow economic growth, it is 
difficult for the state to raise more revenue. 
To properly support th a t statem ent would 
require considerable space; but it is possible 
to describe briefly a couple of the problems. 
The first concerns rates of taxation in 
general. There is a popular belief th a t rates 
of taxation can only go so high without 
d is s u a d in g  p r iv a te  b u s in e s se s  from  
investing; and it is commonly claimed tha t 
rates of taxation a t present are dissuasively 
h igh . T he second problem  concerns 
increased public borrowing from domestic 
sources and is sometimes known as the 
“crowding-out effect” of public borrowing. It 
is claimed th a t increases in public borrowing 
may limit the scope of private corporations 
to borrow funds or, alternatively, th a t the 
pressure of public borrowing may force 
interest rates to levels which make the cost to 
private corporations of borrowed funds 
higher than  can be covered by the likely 
returns on their prospective investments.
Yet to cut certain expenditures is to 
threaten the rate of accumulation in other 
ways. A bandonm ent of public investm ent in 
ports or in adding to the capacity for 
electricity generation or whatever may well 
lead to the abandonm ent of private projects. 
To strain  facilities for secondary schooling 
or for technical train ing m ay lead to 
shortages of workers with particular skills 
ju s t as  co rp o ra tio n s  w ish to begin 
production for which these skills are 
necessary. For the state to fail to underwrite 
a large new development in the private 
sector m ay mean the abandonm ent, as well, 
of many investm ents in associated areas of 
the economy. Part of ‘welfare’ expenditure, 
on the other hand, may seem to be quite 
dispensable.
It m ight be argued th a t capitalists would 
be happy to support a cam paign for ‘smaller 
governm ent’ as long as the th rust of such a 
c a m p a ig n  w ere  to  re d u c e  w e lfa re
expenditure. Capitalists m ight be inclined to 
the view th a t the legitim ating function of the 
state is not directly their concern - th a t it is 
the concern, instead, of ideologues and 
politicians. In  any case, to judge from the 
b e h a v io u r  of m a n y  e x e c u tiv e s  of 
corporations, they are not averse to coercion 
by the state when legitimation seems to be 
failing.
By the same token, capitalists m ay be 
expected to endorse sm aller government in 
so far as it involves the abolition of some 
regulations applying to the conduct of 
business. There are some institutions of the 
state which relate to the way in which 
enterprises interact, and they must be 
m aintained. Other regulations,however, 
concern the relations between corporations 
and workers, consumers and householders 
in the neighbourhood of their factories. They 
serve to keep the peace, to preserve the 
health  of the population, and so on. 
Notw ithstanding their importance, it may 
be possible for capitalists to represent such 
regulations as being luxuries during hard 
times. An easing of regulations would reduce 
not only some operating costs, but the 
adm inistrative costs of assuring the state 
th a t regulations were being met.
Explicit concern with A ustralia’s fiscal 
crisis is becoming increasingly evident in 
the daily press. The Australian Financial 
Review  editorial of February 17th, for 
e x a m p le ,  p u t  th e  v iew  t h a t  th e  
Commonwealth should “stand back” in 
favour of the States - th a t - in other words - 
the level of Commonwealth expenditure 
should be slashed (the editorial w riter’s 
word) in favour of the sta tes’ expenditure on 
infrastructure for m ining and mineral 
processing. A recent paper by Peter 
*Groenewegen suggests th a t such a shift in 
capital expenditure has already well and 
truly b e g u n .E v a n  Jones has made it quite 
clear th a t “welfare” expenditure, or - more 
precisely - Commonwealth expenditure on 
the social wage, declined dram atically 
during the period 1976-1979.10
The point is th a t capitalists can be 
expected to endorse efforts to reduce the size 
of government in the recognition th a t a 
fiscal crisis does indeed exist. They can be 
expected to do so as long as reductions in 
expenditure take place in areas which 
concern them least directly, or which 
concern functions of the state in respect of
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w hich  th ere  a re  a lte rn a tiv e  devices. 
Needless to say, endorsement by the 
executives of the largest corporations can be 
expected to be cautious. If selected areas of 
state expenditure can be reduced sufficiently 
to permit reductions in rates of direct 
taxation, then so much the better: th a t is a 
bonus.
S tre a m lin in g  th e  P u b lic  B u rea u c ra cy
I mentioned earlier th a t it seems to me tha t 
there may be another reason for the support 
which capitalists give to efforts to reduce the 
size of governments. That is the level of state 
expenditure necessary to effect the functions 
of the state m ay be excessively high. The 
wages of workers in regulatory agencies 
constitute in part a drain on the social 
surplus, th a t part of the product of labour 
th a t  m ig h t f in a n c e  fu r th e r  c a p ita l  
accumulation. Now there is no reason to 
believe th a t the m anner in which the labour 
of public servants is organised is the most 
efficient possible. It may well be that, for 
example, too m any people are actually doing 
essentially the same thing or th a t decision­
m aking is too highly centralised. It m ay well 
be th a t a good deal of ‘fa t’ can be trimmed 
without jeopardising the functions of the 
s ta te  th a t  a re  e sse n tia l for cap ita l 
accumulation.
I am not here supporting the Lynch “razor 
gang”: after all, a level of employment in the 
public service which may be regarded as 
excessive from the point of view of the 
functions which the state performs for 
capital may have been necessary to ensure 
th a t the level of unemployment in the 
community did not become substantially  
higher th an  it already is. Furthermore, entry 
into the public service in the past has itself 
served to legitimate capitalism  in A ustralia 
(in the case of Irish-Australians in the years 
after Federation), and may in some measure 
continue to serve in this manner. But, again, 
if alternative m eans of legitim ation seem to 
be working or if coercion is on the agenda, 
capitalists may be inclined to support 
sm a lle r  gov ern m en t as a m ean s of 
increasing the efficiency of the public 
service.
E l e c t o r a l  S u p p o r t  f o r  S m a l l e r  
G o v e rn m en t
It is possible th a t some of the support for 
sm aller government comes from smaller 
capitalists who believe th a t the state has
m aterially independent power - tha t is, 
power independent of capital - and too much 
of it. Such a belief m ay stem from constant 
visitations by representatives of regulatory 
agencies, the evidence th a t the state 
determines aw ard wages and a lack of 
tangible support by the state except perhaps 
in so far as it has implemented tariffs.
It should not be imagined, though, th a t 
support for sm aller government is confined 
to capital. It is to be found within “the 
professional class” and even within the 
working class. Professions such as medicine 
and law have long m aintained tha t 
regulation of the professions is best left to 
the professions themselves and th a t the 
professions are capable of regulating 
themselves. At times, the degree of self­
regulation achieved has been so blatantly  in 
the narrow interests of the professions 
an d /o r has been so inconsistent with the 
assum ptions upon which the sta te’s social 
policies are based th a t the state has had to 
become the regulator. Such interference by 
the state of course engenders the enmity of 
any righteous medico or lawyer or dentist.
D istrust and suspicion of the state, or of 
much of its apparatus, is common among 
workers. There are regulations about how 
you should build a house, w hat you can do in 
your back yard, cutting down trees, where 
you can take the dog for a walk, where the 
kids can go- to school, how to set about 
pressing for an  increase in wages, how and 
where to dem onstrate, and on and on. And 
the state is patently prone to regulate the 
wealthy and powerful less than  it regulates 
the m ass of prople. T hat is not to say that, a t 
the same time, people do not seek the support 
of the state; they do; and they expect the 
state to intervene widely. But the same 
people remain suspicious about what 
interests the state ultim ately serves. The 
same ambivalence is to be found among left 
organisations seeking reforms in the social 
policies of the state.
Some large state corporations are hardly 
good advertisem ents for ‘big government’. 
The State Electricity Commission of 
Victoria comes to mind as one large state 
enterprise which has ridden rough-shod over 
consum ers, w orkers and  its  various 
neighbors in the Latrobe Valley. It is a major 
project for the left in A ustralia to devise 
models for the organisation of state
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enterprises in which there is not only a 
substantial measure of worker control but 
system atic accountability to the people in 
general.
T ra d itio n a lism  an d  C o n se rv a tism
It would be wrong, I think, to imagine th a t 
the reasons for the apparent rise of the ‘new 
righ t’ can be completely encapsulated by the 
drive for sm aller government. In the United 
States there is said to be a concern am ong a 
m inority of electors (remember th a t only 50 
per cent of those eligible to vote actually 
voted in the la s t presidential election) for 
traditionalism , or a re-establishment of 
values thought to have been those of the 
nineteenth century or some earlier era.11 But, 
in some of its aspects, traditionalism  is 
related to the cam paign for sm aller 
government.
T he t r a d i t io n a l i s t s  c a n  be found  
inveighing aga inst legislatures which have 
made it easier for women to obtain 
abortions, which have simplified divorce 
proceedings, which have decriminalised 
homosexuality, which are considering 
d e c r im in a l i s in g  th e  p o s s e s s io n  of 
m arijuana, etc. The traditionalists are not 
only claim ing th a t such moves undermine 
traditional values and th a t traditional 
values should not be undermined, but 
implicitly, th a t the state has too much 
power. The actual decisions to liberalise 
abortion laws, divorce laws, and so on, are 
considered likely to increase the incidence of 
the various actions and behaviour to which 
the laws refer. The larger and more 
pervasive is the state, the more influential 
are such decisions likely to be; the larger and 
more pervasive is the state, the greater is its 
authority likely to be in comparison with 
tha t of the church or of “trad itional” moral 
values. T hat seems to me to be the logic of 
those traditionalists who urge th a t the size 
of government should be reduced. And it 
may be sound logic. Never mind th a t the 
same people are often to be found dem anding 
more and harsher laws.
As I write the last lines of these Notes, I 
read th a t President Reagan has just 
announced his intention to reduce both 
Federal expenditure and rates of income 
taxation in the U.S. by dram atically large 
amounts. My reaction to the announcem ent 
is th a t the intention will not be realised 
(although some of the reductions in
expenditure and tax rates m ay well be met 
by increased expenditures and taxes a t the 
level of the States). Even though American 
capital will gain immensely from increased 
“defence” expenditure and although welfare 
expenditure will undoubtedly be cut, I find it 
d if f ic u l t  to  im a g in e  t h a t  R e a g a n ’s 
enthusiasm  will not lead to excessive cuts in 
those functions of the state on which large 
U.S. organisations depend.
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